Dáil Éireann Debate, Wednesday - 1 October 2025
87. Deputy Pádraig O'Sullivan asked the Minister for Culture, Communications and Sport his views on the vulnerability of Ireland’s undersea cable infrastructure as indicated recently by a person (details supplied); the steps he will take to ensure those cables are protected; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [49095/25]
Amharc ar fhreagraIreland’s maritime area is significant in scale and includes parts of the Atlantic Ocean and the Irish Sea. This vast area creates a challenge for the protection of undersea cable infrastructure and the repair of this infrastructure in the event of damage. As an island Member State of the European Union, Ireland is particularly vulnerable to any threat to its subsea telecommunications cables for connectivity to the Global Internet backbone. These cables carry the data that power our economy, everyday communications and critical services.
At an EU-wide level, the security of the EU's submarine cable infrastructure must be significantly enhanced. The European Commission issued Recommendation (EU) 2024/779 on Secure and Resilient Submarine Cable Infrastructures in February 2024, which aims to improve the security and resilience of submarine telecommunication cable infrastructures through better co-ordination at both national and EU levels.
Recommendation (EU) 2024/779 includes actions to address challenges faced by submarine telecommunication cable infrastructures, ensuring their reliability against potential threats. It further proposes establishing a joint EU governance framework and making more effective use of private-sector investment to support Cable Projects of European Interest (CPEIs).
To support the implementation of Recommendation (EU) 2024/779, the Commission has set up the Submarine Cable Infrastructure Expert Group, comprising representatives from Member States’ authorities and the European Union Agency for Cyber Security (ENISA), to offer guidance and expertise to the Commission. An EU-wide mapping and coordinated risk assessment of submarine cable infrastructures has been agreed by the Expert Group and a report will be published in Autumn 2025.
In February 2025, the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs issued the EU Action Plan on Cable Security (the ‘Action Plan’) which presented a range of measures to bolster the resilience of this critical infrastructure. The Action Plan sets out four priorities to secure critical infrastructure for both communication and energy submarine cables, focusing on prevention, detection, response and repair, as well as deterrence.
The first objective of the Action Plan is to prevent any disruptive incidents and increase resilience of submarine cable infrastructures against potential threats and vulnerabilities. The Action Plan outlines a number of preventive actions, aligned with Recommendation (EU) 2024/779, which are expected to be implemented by the fourth quarter of 2025; these include:
• mapping of existing and planned submarine cable infrastructures
• co-ordinating risk assessments (risks, vulnerabilities and dependencies) on submarine cables, taking into account spare part security of supply, and stress testing methodology
• creating a Cable Security Toolbox of mitigating measures
• developing a priority list of Cable Projects of European Interest (CPEIs).
Officials from my Department are working in the Expert Group to deliver on the actions above with a report to be issued in Autumn 2025. A follow-up report will be delivered on the Cable Security Toolbox and CPEIs priority list in late 2025.
As a second objective, the Action Plan urges the EU to increase its detection capacity to identify and anticipate threats as early as possible. Currently, the EU cannot effectively monitor the threats that affect submarine cable infrastructures. In addition, although there are a number of maritime surveillance and situational awareness systems already in place, such as EMSA’s Integrated Maritime Services system, there is a lack of integration of these systems at the EU level.
In the event of an incident affecting a submarine cable, the third objective of the Action Plan is to respond as quickly as possible to repair the damaged submarine cable in a co-ordinated way, in solidarity with the Member States that are most affected by the disruption. The incidents in the Baltic Sea have highlighted the need for increased co-ordination and synergy between different crisis management frameworks, and for Member States to make use of the existing incident-reporting mechanisms set out in the Critical Entities & Resilience (CER) and Network & Information Security (NIS2) Directives.
The fourth and final step established in the Action Plan is deterrence, to reduce the likelihood of further incidents, by holding malicious actors accountable for their actions and raising the costs for such actors.
While the Action Plan sets out a governance framework and associated actions that can be adopted by Member States, it allows for flexibility depending on individual needs, based on geographic location, extent of maritime area and other factors. Ireland will assess and consider the most appropriate actions to implement as the Action Plan develops. The Expert Group reports (to be issued in Autumn and late 2025) will form part of the key guidance in implementing the prevention pillar of the Action Plan to counter threats and enhance the resilience of submarine telecommunication cable infrastructures. The overall list of actions set out in the Action Plan are broad, across the four pillars, and involve co-operation across Government.
