Dáil Éireann Debate, Tuesday - 10 February 2026
418. Deputy Michael Healy-Rae asked the Tánaiste and Minister for Finance the point at which it becomes a matter for the Houses of the Oireachtas when a statutory tribunal confirms an accountability gap that only the executive has the power to fix (details supplied);; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [10038/26]
Amharc ar fhreagraI understand that the Deputy is referring to the Irish Financial Services Appeals Tribunal (IFSAT) ‘Shane Kavanagh v The Central Bank of Ireland’ (Appeal Ref 030/2025) which is publicly available: www.ifsat.ie/decisions/shane-kavanagh-v-the-central-bank-of-ireland/.
IFSAT is an independent tribunal which hears and determines appeals from aggrieved parties against certain decisions of the Central Bank of Ireland. The legislative basis for IFSAT is set out in Chapter VIIA of the Central Bank Act, 1942 (as amended).
In its published decision in the above case the Tribunal concluded that no statutory provision had been cited or identified which would confer upon the Tribunal (IFSAT) jurisdiction to consider the various allegations made by the Applicant. Specifically, in its decision the Tribunal concluded “the Tribunal must conclude that the Applicant has not identified an “appealable decision” to the Tribunal" which is a requirement for the Tribunal.
It should also be noted that the IFSAT decision stated: “It is also important to note that the Applicant’s concerns are allegations against the Central Bank. Nothing in this decision constitutes any finding that these allegations are correct or substantiated.”
IFSAT has no jurisdiction to examine the Central Bank’s general supervisory strategy or to review the Bank's decisions in respect of any supervisory actions it may take. This is not a mistake or an oversight – this is by design. IFSAT must act within the powers conferred on it since it is a body which determines appeals made by aggrieved parties against certain decisions of the Central Bank.
In the broader context, the Central Bank of Ireland has an extensive body of domestic and EU legislation it must enforce and it is independent in carrying out its functions. This independence is required so that the Bank can work across its different responsibilities: monetary policy, undertaking regulatory and supervisory functions/decisions and, importantly, so that the Bank can focus on its mandate as set out in law. Government and the legislature are generally engaged in respect of financial services legislation where regulatory or supervisory powers need to be amended or updated.
Within the overall legal framework, the Bank is required to assess risk, prioritise issues, and allocate regulatory and supervisory resources in a way that ensures effective system-wide oversight. This legal framework provides for proportionate actions. Regulatory and supervisory decisions must align with EU and national obligations, statutory duties and proportionality principles.
Furthermore, prudential oversight of Irish banks is now undertaken by the Central Bank in close coordination with European Authorities. Since 2014 the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) has been in force which makes the European Central Bank (ECB) the competent authority for banking supervision both in Ireland and the rest of the euro area. This was not the case during the Global Financial Crisis.
The SSM divides institutions into two distinct categories: Significant Institutions (SIs) and Less Significant Institutions (LSIs).
SIs are supervised directly by Joint Supervisory Teams (JSTs). JSTs are formed of staff of the ECB and the relevant national supervisors. So for institutions authorised in Ireland, the relevant JSTs have members in both Frankfurt and Dublin. The size, overall composition and organisation of a JST is tailored to the size, business model and risk profile of the bank it supervises. SI’s in Ireland are AIB Group plc, Bank of American Europe Designated Activity Company, Bank of Ireland Group plc, Barclays Bank Ireland plc and Citibank Europe plc.
Smaller entities, LSIs, are supervised directly by the Central Bank of Ireland with indirect supervision from the ECB. The ECB, which has ultimate responsibility for the functioning of the SSM, may issue guidelines to ensure consistent supervision or assume direct supervision of an institution in certain circumstances.
Finally, the Central Bank is further publicly accountable with annual reports submitted to government, appearances at Oireachtas committees, regular public statements on monetary and regulatory actions, supervisory expectations publications and by the enforcement actions it carries out.
